War-related public campaigns in Russia outside the anti-war narrative
Mentor
Sasha Kappinen is a sociologist and a cultural anthropologist, a researcher with the Public Sociology Laboratory. She graduated from the Higher School of Economics. Her research is focused on de-politization, post-socialism, anthropology of morality and ethics, and perceptions of the war in Ukraine. Sasha is an experienced field researcher. Over the last decade, she has participated in ethnographic research across different regions of Russia.
Project description
Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Laboratory of Public Sociology (PS Lab) has researched the response to this event in Russian society using qualitative methods, including in-depth interviews, focus groups, and ethnography. The findings indicated that over the past two years, the most radical changes in the perception of the war by Russian residents occurred in the first days and weeks following its outbreak. Subsequently, the dominant attitude in society became the justification of military aggression and its non-ideological, apolitical support. The key characteristic of such support, as it appeared from dynamic observations made by PS Lab, was its paradoxical stability.
Despite an aggravating attitude towards specific aspects of the war, marked by increased personal risks and expenditures following the announcement of “partial” mobilization and the spread of hostilities to Russian territories, as well as a negative assessment of the conflict’s prospects, many of our informants persisted in justifying the war. They provided rational explanations for its initiation and continuation while maintaining general loyalty to the current Russian government. Despite growing discontent with the consequences of the “special military operation” and even disillusionment with its officially stated objectives, those who passively endorsed the war did not transition into outright opponents. At least, this dissatisfaction did not translate into an anti-war stance as articulated in liberal opposition media discourse. Such a stance typically condemned the war as criminal, held the nation’s leadership accountable, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of troops from Ukraine without seeking to retain occupied territories. These insights, derived from qualitative data analysis, found quantitative validation. According to survey data monitored by the Chronicles project, while the “core support for the war” had diminished by half over the past year, the “core supporters of an early cessation of the conflict, even if it entailed defeat,” had remained constant.
However, throughout Russian society, there is a growing sense of exhaustion from the ongoing conflict, coupled with a stronger desire for a quick resolution. Participant observation, conducted by PS Lab members across various Russian regions in the fall of 2023, showed that even among those who do not oppose the war outright, critical discussions about the situation are prevalent, often accompanied by complaints against the authorities. Moreover, as the conflict entered its second year, there was a noticeable coming together among those directly impacted within Russia. This includes relatives of the mobilized, stationed indefinitely in the “special military operation” zone, and residents of Russian territories bordering Ukraine, who face regular shelling. These groups have started to voice collective demands to the government, hoping to bring attention to their plight from both officials and society.
In the latter case, this consolidation was of a situational nature, demonstrated by flash mobs on social networks of official Russian TV Channel One, employing hashtags such as #BelgorodisRussia and #ShebekinoisRussia. However, in the former case, it led to the emergence of a fully-fledged social movement known as the “Way Home.”
How is criticism of war and the state structured beyond the confines of the anti-war narrative and opposition agenda? What delineates the boundaries of such criticism, specifically under what circumstances do individuals transition from critical discourse to justification of various aspects of the war? How does the perception of war among apolitical Russians evolve (or remain static) when they personally experience its negative impact? What demands do individuals who do not overtly oppose the war present to the authorities, and through what means do they seek to attract attention to these demands in the public domain? How do they establish channels of communication with the authorities, and what state-society relations’ model lies behind their interactions? Does collective action lead to the politicization of apolitical Russians, and if so, how can we evidence this transformation? What level of protest potential is inherent in such collective activity?
To address these questions, the laboratory participants engaged with anonymized transcripts of interviews conducted with participants of the “Way Home” movement, which were collected by the Laboratory of Public Sociology during the winter of 2024.
The lab also conducted online ethnography to construct a comprehensive data corpus concerning public engagement and communication among Russians negatively affected by the war. This involved gathering materials from the social networks of the movement advocating for the return of mobilized people from the frontlines. The lab participants also monitored public online groups in social networks situated in border settlements impacted by shelling, such as Belgorod, Shebekino, Grayvoron, and others.
The online ethnography approach encompassed not only the collection and organization of digital data but also regular observations of public activity. Additionally, it entailed direct interaction with people through chats and comments on posts, as well as maintaining a field diary to document insights and observations.