Hundreds of thousands of individuals left Russia after February 24, 2022. Many feared prosecution after participating in protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine; many fled possible mobilization and searched for new opportunities due to the risks of doing business in Russia. Many expressed their disagreement with the policy of Russia by leaving the country; others assumed the risks of staying were more significant than the risks related to unprepared migration.

What do we know about these people a year later? Is this picture sufficient for developing and implementing evidence-based policies regarding this wave of migrants? How do they see possible strategies for adaptation in their new residence countries?

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1 Ideas for Russia is a research initiative founded in 2022 by the Faculty of Social Sciences (Charles University), the Prague-based Institute of International Relations and the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom gGmbH.

2 Social Foresight Group is an independent research collective. It unites social researchers from Russia who left in 2022 because of disagreement with the political regime. All team members have rich experience in conducting sociological research. Currently, the team works in different countries (Israel, Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, UK, Grèce, etc.). The group aims to produce high-quality sociological analysis to inform evidence-based decision-making by connecting sociological researchers and data scientists. Members of the group who participated in implementing this research project: Anna Kuleshova (project coordinator), Ilya Lomakin, Elena Nikiforova, Kseniia Pavlenko, Maria Volkova (head of research), Alexey Voronkov.

3 Maria Volkova, Kseniia Pavlenko & Anna Kuleshova & Alexei Voronkov wrote the main chapters of the report; Dmitry Kokorin curated the project on behalf of BNNF, drafted the conclusions and recommendations, and edited a few other parts of the document. We acknowledge the assistance and valuable comments and inputs we received from our colleagues and partners Dmitry Gorsky, Tetiana Kotelnykova, Zhanna Nemtsova, Levan Nadinabaidze, and Tomáš Petříček. All the errors remain the responsibility of the authors and editor.
Are there missed opportunities and neglected humanitarian issues for Czechia and other EU member states?

This preliminary report summarises the key takeaways of a research project conducted in 2023 by the Social Foresight Group and commissioned by the Ideas for Russia platform and the Boris Nemtsov Foundation for Freedom.

The purpose of the research was to examine connections between the economic strategies of migrants (including entrepreneurship), their social ties, and the institutional frameworks of the countries where they reside.

For the research, we have chosen five countries: Serbia, Kazakhstan, Israel, Armenia, and Turkey. Our decision was based on two factors: the significant number of Russian citizens who have moved to these countries in the past year and notable differences in political, economic, and institutional conditions. Such diversity provides us with a solid basis for comparing and analyzing how these factors influence migrants' economic choices and strategies of adaptation.

The complete project report will be forthcoming in the fall of 2023.
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1. Introduction & Key Takeaways

This project explores adaptation, and economic and entrepreneurial strategies among individuals who have left Russia after February 24, 2022, and emigrated to Serbia, Kazakhstan, Israel, Armenia, or Turkey. It studies specific economic strategies these migrants pursue and factors influencing the choice between these options. The project also examines entrepreneurial strategies among relocating Russian citizens and issues impacting these practices. It investigates in what circumstances relocating Russian citizens were ready to open new businesses despite all the risks and difficulties of moving into a new country and adapting to local contexts.

The project’s research framework utilizes a simple theoretical model for explaining a range of economic strategies among these groups and breaking down factors that inform these strategies in countries of interest. The model considers two sets of factors as the most significant ones in this context. On the one hand, it explores the social ties of relocating individuals and how these networks changed after February 24, 2022. On the other hand, it considers institutional and market environments in the counties that became migration destinations — i.e., how migration policies, economic conjunctures, and labor market conditions in particular countries circumscribed opportunities for adaptation.

The key takeaways from this project are as follows:

- Rich social ties and connections make it possible to diversify risks, so migrants with greater social capital can implement more ambitious economic strategies. Transnational ties, in cases when the migrant’s initial acquaintances had dispersed to different countries, contribute to highly mobile strategies (in this situation these migrants are more ready for integration in new contexts).

- Entrepreneurial initiatives in new diasporas often do not pursue making profits but are dedicated to finding and connecting people with shared values and are based on solidarity. Simultaneously, these enterprises often target fellow Russians, which can create closed markets.
In the current climate, *national identity* (being Russian) is not functioning as a unifying idea. Instead, *professional identities* and the idea of a *shared destiny* are the most common points of convergence. Therefore, the most unifying view is “Russian professionals in exile.” Ethnic and religious identity becomes a point of convergence for ethnic and religious groups not associated with the titular nation (for example, Bashkirs and Muslims).

People who unite in emerging communities in new diasporas contrast themselves not to local residents but to other Russians — those who remained in Russia, those who left before the war, those who left not because of the war, those Russians, which they perceive as representatives of another social group or bearers of different values. Therefore, new diasporas are open enough to integrate into the host society.

Belonging to a community can prompt the most ambitious strategies (eagerness to pursue professional growth, for instance). It also can stimulate assertiveness for finding ways for further relocation in EU countries and the USA.

There is a significant dispersity of *economic strategies* between countries in the sample and some differentiation in each of these countries. For instance, in Israel, migrants prefer to work for the local market or international companies. In Kazakhstan, Armenia, Turkey, and Serbia, those working for the local market likely got a job in a company opened by other Russians. In Kazakhstan, Armenia, Turkey, and Serbia, most migrants either continue to work for employers from Russia or seek a job for an international company (or engage in the global market of freelance work). Those with better transnational social ties usually choose the latter option. Working remotely for Russian-based employers is widespread in Kazakhstan.

Many Russian citizens in new diasporas aspire and dream of moving further to Europe (to member-states of the European Union in particular) and the United States because they believe these countries align more with their values. At the same time, such a move is perceived as complex and challenging, requiring an increase in one’s professional level.
Well-developed transnational social ties contribute to the determination to move to Europe or the US. Deterrent factors are the uncertainty and unpredictability of the policies towards immigrants from Russia in many European countries and perceived legal insecurity related to such a move.

The study used qualitative methods, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative non-reactive methods - parsing open telegram channels dedicated to moving to the countries studied.

We conducted 75 interviews in 5 countries during the first phase of our research. Each country had 15 interviews with five to six entrepreneurs. Our sample was diverse, with people of different ages\(^4\), professional backgrounds\(^5\), and family statuses\(^6\) interviewed. To ensure diversity in sampling, we used multiple entry points into the field and posted a questionnaire in various telegram channels for Russian migrants. The interviews were analyzed using MAXQDA software.

In the quantitative phase, we analyzed more than 740,000 messages from 31 telegram channels across five countries. The messages, spanning from 22 February 2022 to 1 June 2023, were screened for keywords and clustered to identify problems faced by Russians in host countries and moments of cooperation and mutual assistance participants of telegram channels.

This work-in-progress report consists of preliminary conclusions of the research project conducted in a demanding time frame. The final results and data analysis will be presented in the autumn of 2023. Chosen research framework has some limitations, for instance, the research would benefit from including data from countries like Cyprus, Georgia, and a few countries within the EU. It was impossible due to practical constraints and would be addressed in further research projects along with the role of well-established companies and the impact of household typology on choosing migration strategies. Another possibility is to collect a more comprehensive data set mapping the transnational social ties of new migrants, which will also be a part of the agenda for further research.

\(^4\) 6-9 respondents over 40, 6-9 respondents under 40 in each country.
\(^5\) 2-3 respondents in skilled employment in the host country, 1-2 in unskilled employment in each country
\(^6\) 5-11 singles, 2-5 couples, 2-5 families with children in each country.
2. Research framework: Mobility, Social and Institutional Embeddedness, and Degree of Ambition

The framework and methodology used in this study were based on the ideas of *mixed embeddedness* by Kloosterman and Rath (2001) and *transnational mixed embeddedness* by Bagwell (2018). These conceptions are built upon the theory of social embeddedness developed by Portes and Sensenbrenner (1993). Portes and Sensenbrenner's theory highlights the importance of *social capital, trust, and solidarity* among diaspora members in shaping their economic strategies. However, their focus is mainly on analyzing social ties and determining the level of integration or isolation of the diaspora from the receiving society in this aspect.

The conceptions of mixed embeddedness and transnational mixed embeddedness allow for the consideration of several other variables. For instance, these approaches take into account external factors such as market conditions and migration policies. In addition, it's essential to recognize that migration is a transnational phenomenon. Migrants are able to maintain social connections in their host country, their country of origin, and even in other countries. The diaspora is a social network that connects people in different countries, enabling migrants to access market resources in multiple nations simultaneously through this transnational network.

Thus, we will distinguish between *social embeddedness* and *institutional embeddedness*. Social embeddedness refers to migrants' *social ties* (both local and transnational) and the factors that contribute to their reinforcement, mobilization, or transformation (*solidarity, trust, points of convergence*). On the other hand, institutional embeddedness describes the extent to which migrants have *access to political and economic institutions* in the receiving country and how this influences their economic strategies. These two sets of variables, *social embeddedness*, and *institutional embeddedness*, will be used to explain the economic strategies of Russians who migrated after February 24th, 2022.

The relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables are shown in the diagram below.
For the convenience of analysis, we have categorized all economic and entrepreneurial strategies along two axes: the degree of mobility and the degree of ambition.

The term ‘degree of mobility’ refers to how open a person is to integrating into the economic landscape of a new country. Meanwhile, ‘degree of ambition’ refers to one's perception of professional and economic opportunities in this new environment.

It is worth noting that mobility and ambition are characteristics of strategies, not migrants themselves. In other words, an individual may be physically mobile and move from one country to another, but their economic strategy can be immobile if it remains tied to the economic context of Russia.

The least mobile strategies are those oriented towards the economy of the country of origin — Russia. An example of such a strategy is maintaining remote employment in Russia.

Strategies of moderate mobility are those oriented towards the economy of the host country. This can include working for a local company, opening a sole
proprietorship, or obtaining self-employed status in the host country. It also includes opening a business targeting the local market. In all these cases, the individual strives for full integration into the economy of the host country.

The most mobile strategies are those oriented towards a transnational context. In such strategies, migrants may consider maintaining economic activities in multiple countries simultaneously, even in different parts of the world. Transnational entrepreneurship targeting the economies of multiple countries (e.g., when the market is in one country, the legal entity is in another, and partners are in third countries) is an ideal example of a highly mobile economic strategy. Another example is online work or services connected to various countries.

The degree of ambition is ordered along the poles of ‘survival’ and ‘self-realization’. Those on the survival pole have neither savings nor a stable income source and are willing to take any job to meet their basic needs. Those at the moderate level are focused on earning money using their existing professional skills. The reasons may be a strong professional identity or an unwillingness to venture into new professional fields. An example of such a strategy could be choosing to continue working as a journalist in the new country, even though this occupation may not bring the same level of income. At a higher level of ambition (‘self-realization’), individuals perceive relocation as an opportunity to enhance their professional level, choose a new, more promising career path, or start their own business.
3. Research findings: New Russian Diasporas in Armenia, Israel, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Serbia — Adaptation, Economic and Entrepreneurial Strategies

The findings represented in this section consist of three parts.

Firstly, we show how the economic strategies of relocating Russian citizens are influenced by their existing social ties and how entrepreneurship and ambitious economic strategies are encouraged by solidarity among the Russian diaspora and the formation of new communities.

The second part describes how market and institutional conditions in the five countries in our sample impact the mobility of economic strategies among Russians. In other words, it explores whether entrepreneurs and employees strive to integrate into the host country's economy or seek remote earning opportunities in other countries.

Lastly, the final part focuses on how our respondents perceive their prospects for further migration.

3.1. How Migrants’ Social Ties Influence their Economic Strategies

The presence of social ties outside of Russia has a positive impact on the subjective perception of one's own economic opportunities and, consequently, on the level of ambition in economic strategies. This finding is consistent with conclusions drawn from other studies in the field of migration sociology. These studies demonstrate that immigrants establish transnational networks that support newcomers and enable them to diversify the risks associated with relocation through the support of friends and acquaintances (Massey, 1990). Therefore, the most economically risk-prone groups of people (those with the highest and lowest incomes) are the ones who initially migrate to new countries, and as the networks become more established, others join them (ibid).

In our study, such support can come from both a transnational network and a local small group. Transnational networks consist of social ties with other Russians
outside their country of residence, while local small groups are ways of connecting with fellow migrants in the host country. Typically, these networks are built on trusting contacts that the migrant established before leaving Russia. The first type of network forms when the individual’s social circle disperses to different countries, and the second type emerges when a portion of their social circle relocates to a specific country.

Transnational networks serve two functions. Firstly, they can support physical mobility. Among our respondents, some individuals moved across multiple countries, relying on their social connections in different countries during the relocation process. Secondly, these networks can facilitate highly mobile economic strategies. Some respondents used transnational networks to find freelance work or employment in third countries, particularly in the EU.

Transnational networks are vital for Russian migrants, as they play a role of a safety net, especially considering the difficulty of earning a sufficient income in the inner market of all the studied countries, except for Israel. Therefore, those who maintain sufficient connections and social ties in Europe to help them find remote work or clients, among other possibilities, have better prospects for successful adaptation and economic well-being. In turn, support from the local small group helps individuals cope with everyday challenges and, to a certain extent, establish roots in their new host countries.

*Communities* have a unique role that differentiates them from transnational networks and local small groups. In our research, we define a community as a group where two key elements are present: *solidarity* (when Russians provide mutual support and communicate more frequently) and a *convergence point* (ideas and beliefs that explain why they need to come together). Unlike small groups and transnational networks, communities are constantly growing as members actively network within them. These communities can be local or include transnational connections. They help individuals with little experience in starting a business venture to embark on their entrepreneurial journey in migration, often with the support of communities, which become a source of new ‘*weak ties*’ (in the meaning proposed by Granovetter, 1973). This ultimately contributes to the formation of highly ambitious strategies among community participants.

**How do communities form**
The formation of new Russian diasporas can be better understood by examining communities. For a community to exist, it needs a shared idea or point of convergence that serves as the basis for solidarity. National (but not ethnic) identity cannot fulfill this role, as many people seek to distance themselves from it. Therefore, other foundations are necessary to achieve solidarity.

1) Professional identity

Professional identity as a basis for solidarity can be expressed as follows: we unite not because we are Russians but because we are Russian-speaking designers, actors, restaurateurs, bartenders, hairdressers, and so on. The types of professional identities vary greatly but predominantly encompass the spheres of culture and services. In all cases, migrants exhibit a strong sense of corporate pride, believing that Russian speakers in a particular field can competently compete with professionals from other countries.

Consequently, this becomes the foundation for highly ambitious economic strategies. Migrants are willing to establish their businesses in the new country, even though they worked as payroll employees in Russia. Some even express hope that their labor will change or elevate the state of their professional field in the host country and that they will learn to provide "excellent service" in Israel, or Serbia/Armenia/Kazakhstan in a few years. This enthusiasm is fueled by Russian immigrants who, expecting higher quality, are willing to pay more for the services of Russian-speaking entrepreneurs than local residents. In the service sector, this creates a semblance of "ethnic entrepreneurship", where businesses created by the diaspora primarily target the diaspora itself.

2) Idea of shared destiny or unifying event

Another idea that serves as a point of convergence is the belief that the destinies of the Russian emigrants are intertwined. According to this idea, many have found themselves in challenging life circumstances due to the same events; these factors necessitate their unity and mutual assistance in overcoming them. Among the respondents who voiced this belief, there is a significant number of those who moved to the host country with a substantial portion of their previous Russian social circle. Similarly, many individuals mentioned that they lost or severed a significant number of
connections in Russia after their departure. For the latter group, the opportunity to establish new connections through the community serves as a means to rebuild their social capital.

When the idea of shared destiny is combined with professional identity, solidarity is further strengthened. This enables the maintenance of large transnational networks of social connections. In such a situation, community members can exchange their transnational social capital, which becomes the foundation for highly mobile strategies and transnational entrepreneurship.

3) Ethnic and religious identities

Russian Federation is a multi-national country, with a large part of the population having diverse ethnic identities and ties in ethnically defined communities. In our sample, some people who distance themselves from Russian nationality tend to amplify such identification with other ethnic groups. According to respondents, some have started to identify themselves based on their affiliation with a different ethnic group, such as the Bashkirs, who have created a transnational network of support and assistance. Moreover, religious identity can be significant, particularly among Russian Muslims who have moved to traditionally Islamic nations.

4) Who are the "Good Russians"

One interesting aspect of community solidarity is the way groups differentiate themselves from others. Portes (1993) observed that this is often done in opposition to local residents who may not accept immigrants. However, in the case of departing Russians, they tend to contrast themselves with other Russians, including those who migrated to the host country before the war, those who stayed in Russia, and those with different values and political views. This fact makes the described communities quite open to integration within the context of the host country.

Communities as a Catalyst for Entrepreneurial Activity

Referring to the transnational entrepreneurship, we follow Bagwell (2015). We are referring to small and medium-sized businesses that use the resources of several countries.
Migrants often establish businesses that serve as the foundation for building a community, such as cafes, schools, or coworking spaces. Some migrants aim to create a community of like-minded people in addition to generating profit. They see starting a business as an opportunity to find 'similar people' and form a social circle. This is especially true when the business is not their primary source of income or was not established for pursuing their professional ambitions. These migrants use their resources and entrepreneurial skills to find solidarity and common ground with others. Thus, highly ambitious strategies are often associated with the need for solidarity and the search for common grounds for solidarity (points of convergence).

When working with others, there is a phenomenon known as ‘enforceable trust’ (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993: 1332). Some migrants prefer to work with Russian citizens who are similar to them, as they find it easier to trust and work with them. They believe that Russians have high professional skills and are more responsible. Entrepreneurs who believe in a "shared destiny" hire Russians to help them adjust to life in the new country more quickly. However, if a business created by Russians is only focused on serving Russians, it may struggle to integrate into the market context of the host country.

3.2. How Institutional Settings of the Host Countries Influence Migrant’s Economic Strategies

The countries where the study was conducted differ significantly in terms of economic development, investment climate, labor market conditions, and openness for doing business. All of these factors, to varying degrees, influence the economic strategies of migrants from Russia, and especially their entrepreneurial strategies.

The domestic labor market in Armenia, Kazakhstan, Turkey, and Serbia is usually perceived by migrants from Russia as unpromising due to low wages. Therefore, while in these countries, they either continue to work for Russia (a low-mobility economic strategy) or focus on income opportunities in third countries (a high-mobility economic strategy). The exception is Israel, where working in an unskilled job in the local market is more profitable than keeping a job in Russia remotely. In addition to these main trends, each country has its specifics. Providing a more precise estimation regarding the
distribution of these strategies in these and other countries requires further research and application of quantitative methodology.

Armenia

In Armenia, highly mobile strategies are more common. A low cost of living level, and the ability to live without much effort to legalize, make working for a foreign company or freelancing based on a network of transnational social ties an attractive economic strategy. In addition, a large number of IT specialists have moved to Armenia to work remotely for foreign (more often European and American) companies (Modex 2022; Armenpress 2022). Medium-mobility strategies in Armenia were used by those who were hired to work for businesses opened by Russian migrants.

Many services-related businesses are opening in Armenia. And more often it happens around communities. Also, Russians working in IT have opened a significant number of legal entities in Armenia. Meanwhile, if emigration and participation in the community have become a trigger for some to open their own business for the first time (and, for example, instead of working in a salon, open their own salon), few people plan to develop this business in the long term, as they are pessimistic about opportunities in the local market. They are thinking of moving further or making their entrepreneurship transnational.

Israel

In Israel, repatriates usually try to get a job in the local labor market or a European / American company. At the same time, since unskilled labor is being paid relatively well in Israel, some people prefer to change from high-skilled jobs to low-skilled ones. Therefore, medium and, rarely, highly mobile strategies are more common in Israel. Low mobility strategies are hardly viable here due to the high cost of living.

Large active communities of entrepreneurs are emerging in Israel. There are many meetings dedicated to the community building of entrepreneurs in the field of IT, and corresponding communities are emerging. They also organize international events where they invite Russian entrepreneurs who have settled in Cyprus and other countries. However, many consider the Israeli market as not very promising for developing their own business due to its size and high competition. Therefore, these
entrepreneurs prefer to open legal entities in other countries (Cyprus, Georgia, Serbia), using, meanwhile, the connections developed in Israel. Thus, transnational entrepreneurship is even more widespread in Israel than in Armenia and Serbia.

**Kazakhstan**

In Kazakhstan, more than in other countries of our sample, low-mobility strategies are widespread. The following factors contribute to this. Firstly, the majority of people who move to Kazakhstan relocated from non-capital cities and have had fewer transnational connections, so highly mobile strategies are out of reach for many. Secondly, Kazakhstan maintains close relations with Russia. Thirdly, the low cost of living in Kazakhstan and the structure of the financial system make it possible to work for Russian-based employers sustainably. The substantial factor is access to Russian salaries paid through the MIR cards, which, albeit with growing restrictions, continue to be serviced by Kazakh banks.

In Kazakhstan, entrepreneurial strategies in many cases are based on strong links to Russia. Many are focused on trade, including creating new supply chains between Russia and Kazakhstan (in our sample, these include trading of such commodities as sunflower oil and linen). Others are focused on services (ready meals in our sample). In all considered cases, such businesses quickly began to make a profit (approximately four months after launching). A substantial part of the informants develop businesses in Russia and Kazakhstan simultaneously, and their enterprises in Kazakhstan are partly dependent on Russian clients.

**Serbia**

Both low- and high-mobility strategies are common in Serbia. A fundamental factor is a large number of Russian IT companies that relocated their businesses and workforce to Serbia. Also, people move here on offers from Serbian companies. Russians are actively opening new enterprises in this country, for which they also hire Russians. Some of them use their old social connections acquired back in Russia to find work in these companies. Besides that, a smaller number of respondents used medium-mobility strategies in Serbia (as well as in Armenia), particularly those who were hired to work in businesses opened by Russian immigrants.
Serbia is perceived as the most promising destination for creating enterprises focused on the local market. However, such a business is largely focused on Russians who moved there and seek to reproduce their usual way of life. Some informants noted that cafes and restaurants opened by Russians often do not take into account Serbian specifics and the Serbian style of consumption, and therefore may not survive if Russians start to leave Serbia.

Transnational entrepreneurship is also common in Serbia due to evolving communities and the fact that people with a relatively large number of transnational connections moved there.

**Turkey**

Migrant’s population in Turkey is also mainly characterized by *low-mobility strategies*. Some wealthier people have moved here, either working remotely in Russia or having income or business there. Some of them continue to travel to Russia and come back regularly. Among those who moved to Turkey, a significant number bought property here before February 2022 as an investment or property for their own summer vacation. *Medium mobility strategies* (working in the local market) are typical for young migrants from provincial towns. For them, the salary level in an English-speaking Istanbul company could well compete with their salaries in Russia.

Turkey, according to the respondents, is a complex country in terms of starting and running a business for foreigners. All entrepreneurs participating in the study noted that it is almost impossible to open a company without involving a local lawyer and accountant. To overcome these hurdles, there is a need for a person who speaks Turkish, and who knows local legislation, as well as the specifics of organizing and doing business, in particular, understanding the gap between formal and informal rules (that is, which rules are mandatory and which are not). Moreover, according to informants, it is better for a foreigner to do business in Turkey with a local partner. Finally, as in other countries, in Turkey, some new businesses (such as schools, cafes, and co-working spaces) became the basis for the evolvement of migrant communities.

**3.3. Further mobility**

The countries of the EU and the USA were repeatedly mentioned in our interviews as places where our respondents want or plan to move later. They explained...
their motivation by the fact that Western Europe is more in line with their values (democratic political system, tolerant attitude towards people of different ethnic and religious affiliations) or self-perception (“I feel myself more European, [rather than...]”). The war’s consequences expanded the understanding of Europe among these Russian citizens, giving them the understanding that it is multifaceted both in terms of legislation and in terms of attitudes toward migrants. The US has been constantly referred to as the ‘country of emigrants’, where you can find a place for yourself, regardless of origin.

The political atmosphere in the host country has a strong influence on the desire of Russians to move to another place. Thus, the election of Israel’s far-right government, and authoritarianism in Turkey made our respondents wonder where they can find a country with a more liberal and democratic regime.

Speaking about the possibility of further moving to Europe (mainly to countries belonging to the European Union) or the United States, our respondents often tried to assess themselves as ‘worthy’ or ‘unworthy’ of this. Moving to these countries is seen by them as the most ambitious economic strategy with a high barrier to entry, risky, but potentially opening up many opportunities. The perception of risks, among other things, is connected with the unpredictability of the policy of individual European countries towards Russians, both seeking to obtain visas and those who have already arrived on their territory. From the point of view of the respondents, such a move required special preparation. To become ‘worthy’, you must first learn the language, get additional education, and improve professional competence. Therefore, moving plans can be shelved.

Two factors may contribute to the decision to move further to the EU and the US. The first is transnational social networks in Europe and US, which can provide support when moving. The second factor is belonging to the community. As we wrote above, communities contribute to highly ambitious strategies, including moving to other destinations. Having felt that with the support of the community, it is possible to achieve success in a current host country, the respondents project and maintain this confidence when they consider plans for further relocation.
3. Conclusions and recommendations

While the further path of development of the socio-political situation in Russia, as well as the outcomes of its unjust and unlawful invasion of Ukraine, remain uncertain, in any plausible scenario, one should assume that significant numbers of Russian citizens would be present in neighborhood countries in the years to come. Therefore, these new diasporas should be constantly studied to get fair and transparent data regarding their composition and impact on demographic dynamics, labor markets, economic development, and civil societies in the countries of their residence and beyond.

It is not enough for Czechia and other EU member states to treat these people solely as a national security threat, assuming purely opportunistic strategies and complicity in the current conflict on the Russian side. On the contrary, many left Russia because they condemned the invasion and lost valuable assets there due to the relocation. Their human and social capital, professional backgrounds, and embeddedness in the international context should also be considered.

Altogether, participants of this wave of emigration from Russia constitute a considerable pool of labor resources; they include high-skilled professionals in various fields and entrepreneurs. In many cases, they already provide services to EU-based companies through out-sourcing, thus, indirectly influencing the EU's labor market. Besides that, a significant proportion of the households of these migrants are families; most of them are ready to invest in their children's education. Such migration can influence the demographic situation in the new host countries positively.

At the same time, some members of this workforce are still partly dependent on ties to Russian-based employers; it seems that the level of such dependency is maximal in Kazakhstan and minimal in Israel. It could force some of them to return to Russia in the near future due to weak opportunities for adaptation in the new countries of residence and a lack of resources to fight barriers to opening businesses and finding new jobs.

This pilot research shows a diversity of adaptation strategies among relocating entrepreneurs and other professionals; it also discovers emerging communities based on various types of solidarity and multiple identities among the migrants in the countries considered. The shared ideas of professional identity and a collective destiny primarily drove the rise of solidarity in such communities. Research shows that Russian migrants often come together not based on their national identity but because they belong to a particular professional group. "Russian professionals in exile" could serve as their main
slogan. In turn, such communities often become hubs for various entrepreneurial initiatives and activities.

Some risk factors and challenges should be considered as well when dealing with the new diasporas. There is a diversity of views regarding the current events; even these migrants who stand against the Russian invasion of Ukraine are not always ready to publicly declare their position because they have relatives in Russia and concerns regarding their safety. In many cases, migrants are not keen to learn foreign languages and customs, and some of them do not pay taxes to the full extent.

Institutional actors in Czechia, other EU member states, and on the European level can consider these developments significant enough to formulate specific policy responses. Such actions could target these circumstances on different levels. Depending on the need to influence their trajectories and migration strategies, specific incentives could be created for relocating individuals. Institutional actors within the countries which are subject to the European Neighbourhood Policy and emerging civil society organizations and communities in these countries require support for dealing with the current challenges. All these developments also require continuing scrutiny and monitoring.

Hence, policy recommendations based on this research findings could be broken down into three main categories as follows:

**Monitoring and Research**

- Establish and support research and monitoring programs which will allow research centers and independent researchers to continue to survey new diasporas outside and within the EU;
- Support research projects based on advanced frameworks, such as network analysis, which promise a better understanding of complex developments within communities of migrants and typologies of their individual trajectories. Another research angle can cover the role of organizations and other institutional actors, such as regulators and big businesses, in shaping these societal processes. Such surveys should cover countries outside and within the EU;
- Differentiate and channel resources to provide flexible instruments for completing the short-term research tasks and immediate data-collection and stimulate some
long-term oriented and fundamental inquiries in this field (through Horizon Europe programs and alike).

**European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership**

Post-war migration from Russia is significant enough to influence demographic, economic, and sometimes political conditions in countries included in European Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership. Such frameworks as a European Neighbourhood Instrument could be used to assist these countries which accommodate the bulk of the migration wave, particularly in accordance with such priorities as human rights, good governance and the rule of law, support to civil society, and mobility and migration management. Hence, specific measures to address these circumstances could include:

- Supporting integration programs for incoming migrants;
- Monitoring new developments from the human rights perspective, including protecting rights for access to education and other basic needs in the countries in question;
- Engaging with the emergent civil society oriented communities and social entrepreneurs within new Russian diasporas and leaders of Russian civil society in exile for creating sustainable hubs for societal development and integration.

**Human Capital, Labour Resources, and Entrepreneurship**

Post-war migration from Russia can influence the economic growth rate in countries within the European neighborhood area and in the EU. If the right conditions would be met, it can be instrumental in creating new pockets of growth, for development in specific industries and areas of entrepreneurship, and for providing a pool of labor resources and human capital where needed. To achieve such objectives, specific measures could be delivered for:

- Lowering barriers and transactional costs for opening new businesses;
- Creating integration programs aimed to assist employment according to professional skill-sets of migrants;
- Providing access to venture capital and other financial services to relocating entrepreneurs and businesses, particularly to those who sever ties with Russia and lost access to Russian markets;
- Assisting professionals, businessmen, and academics, who condemn the invasion, in searching for jobs within the EU and obtaining relevant visas and working permits;
- Creating incubators for new businesses in the IT industry and other innovative sectors.
References


